Summary: -Goal: stop automated dictionary attacks -Avoid: locking out legitimate users (DOS, customer service costs) -Pricing via processing paradigm: user must do some computation when responding -Several possible tests to distinguish between human users and computer programs (Reverse Turing Tests, RTTs) -characteristics of RTTs: -automated generation -easy for humans -hard for machines (guessing gives same probability of success) -small probability of correct guess -example: ticketmaster, read this string and type it in -note: they don't need it to be impossible, just to take a lot of computation -Could do an RTT for every attempt -Observation: users typically use a limited set of computers that are not the same computer that a dictionary attack might come from -store something that says they were correctly logged on from that machine before, thus eliminating the need to do an RTT for that machine every time -Main Contribution: An algorithm for determining when to perform an RTT during a login session Pros: 1. Reasonable assumptions about online atacks, i.e. concentration on online attacks only. 2. Machine computation of RTT anwers is not assumed proven to be hard. 3. Reasonalbe assumptions about user behavior, i.e. limited number of computers that users use 4. Protocol is simple to implement: a) RTTs are already used b) Cookies c) Only generate RTTs for a fraction of incorrect logins 5. Ability to tune p - number of RTTs - is beneficial. 6. There is a strategy to deal with dictionary attacks. 7. There is a strategy to deal with cookie theft. 8. Partial analysis of the security of protocol 9. Good argument that their protocol could be adopted a) Portability b) User-friendliness Cons: * The paper details that alternative Reverse Turing Tests to the image-based solution presented in the paper are possible, and even suggests in Section 2.1 an audio-based RTT. While I agree that such alternative RTTs can exist, my concern is that widespread use of the technique described in the paper would most likely NOT provide alternatives to image-based solutions and that this would have negative impact to visually-impaired users. That is, when developers are under "crunch time" conditions, they may not be likely to incorporate alternative RTTs into their solutions unless forced to (for example, by ADD laws). * The paper seems to suggest that the RTT presented to a user is deterministic. If this means that they are always presented with the same image, and if the user has difficulty figuring out that particular image, the user may always fail to respond correctly when challenged. A better solution might be to present the user with a randomly-generated challenge each time. * Image-based and audio-based RTTs may present difficulties for users with limited technology such as text-based browsers (Lynx) or cellphone browsers. * Since technology continues to improve, it seems that whatever RTT is used for the protocol described in this paper, methods for circumvention will inevitably be developed. Therefore, it seems like a better approach to try to locate a solution to the broader authentication problem rather than an incremental solution. * The protocol presented in the paper seems simplistic yet the analysis performed is more of a "hand waving" level. It would be nice to see a more thorough analysis of the statistics/probabilities involved. * The solution presented in the paper seems constrained to web-based authentication applications. For example, it seems difficulty or impossible to apply it to a console-based login. * The solution presented in the paper is already in somewhat common use, and the real contribution of the paper seems to be the algorithm presented in Figure 1 (page 6). Is this contribution enough to be worthy of an entire publication? Strong Accept: 0 Accept : 7 Reject : 4 Strong Reject: 0